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ABSTRACT
The DoD Inventory Reduction Plan (IRP) was mandated by
Congress in May 1990 to meet the challenge of re-sizing
Defense inventories while maintaining the gains in readiness
resulting from the defense strategy of the 1980's. This
thesis is an evaluation of cne effects of implementing the IRP
on Navy inventory management practices at ASO, and on
readiness at NADEP Alameda. "G" management (GMAN) reports and
supply effectiveness data provided by FISC Oakland were
utilized in making overall readiness and level of service
determinations. The Navy's organization and major management
initiatives relating to the IRP are also discussed. Finally,
an assessment is made of what is currently being done by the
private sector to reduce inventory levels and whether
application of these systems and/or practices can be utilized
by the military to reduce secondary item inventory levels.
!. ."u, i3 r or
L~isi
.. . .---- 
.---------....
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................. ................... 1
A. BACKGROUND ....... .................... ..... 2
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS ............ .............. 2
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ... .............. . .... 3
1. Primary Research Question ..... ... ......... 3
2. Subsidiary Research Questions ..... ....... 3
D. METHODOLOGY ................. .................. 3
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .......... ........... 5
II, REVIEW OF INVENTORY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 7.....7
A. BACKGROUND ................. .................. 7
B. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES OF THE IRP ... ......... .. 13
C. NAVY'S ORGANIZATION FOR IRP .... .......... 16
1. Management Organization and the IMIP . . .. 17
2. Cultural Change ......... .............. 19
D. NAVY MAJOR MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES ......... .. 20
III. EFFECT OF THE IRP ON INVENTORY MGMT AND READINESS 23
A. INTRODUCTION ........... ................. 23
B. REDUCTION PLAN FOR AVIATION SPARES .. ...... 23
C. EFFECT OF MATERIAL SHORTAGES AT A NADEP . . .. 29
1. Material Pipeline ....... ............. 29
iv
2. Description of maintenance ... ......... .. 30
3. Condition Code "G" Repairable Components 33
4. Material Availability ..... ........... 36
5. Analysis ............ .................. 39
IV. PRIVATE SECTOR INVENTORY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND
PRACTICES ................ ..................... 41
A. INTRODUCTION ............. ................. 41
B. INVENTORY CONTROL SYSTEMS ...... ............
1. Manufacturing Resource Planning II . . .. 42
2. Just-In-Time Production ..... .......... 44
C. INVENTORY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES .. ........ 49
D. ANALYSIS ............. ................... 52
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... .......... 55
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK .......... .. 58
LIST OF REFERENCES ............. .................. 60
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ........ ............... 62
v
I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an evaluation of the Department of Defense
(DoD) Inventory Reduction Plan (IRP) and its implementation
effects on Naval inventory management procedures and fleet
readiness. Inventory control or management systems, and
practices utilized in private industry, will also be discussed
and evaluated for feasibility of application to the DoD.
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I will
present background information, purpose or scope of the
thesis, research questions, methodology, and identify
limitations of the study. Chapter II provides background
information related to both the DoD and Department of the Navy
(DoN) Inventory Reduction Plans. The program objectives and
major management initiatives associated with the DoD and DoN
IRP's, respectively, are also included.
Chapter III discusses the effect of the IRP on Naval
inventory management practices at an inventory control point
(ICP), and on readiness at an aviation depot repair facility.
Information regarding the type of data utilized for readiness
projections will also be included in Chapter III. Inventory
management systems and practices used to effectively manage
inventory levels in the private sector, and their potential
usefulness to DoD, are discussed in Chapter IV. The final
• mm • |1
chapter provides conclusions and recommendations for future
work in this area.
A. BACKGROUND
The Defense strategy of the 1980's was focused on
modernizing our forces while increasing the levels of
readiness and staying power. This approach was seen as a
means of correcting the technological obsolescence and
shortages of spare parts which severely hindered operational
readiness during the late 1970's. The combination of
introducing new weapons and systems, modernizing current
systems, and increasing support levels across the board led to
the significant growth in inventory levels during the 1980's.
The material management system of the 20th century and
beyond must continue to react rapidly and accurately when
confronted with various threat scenarios. Our current
challenge is to preserve that "readiness" capability as we
downsize while simultaneously improving operations.
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The objective of the study is twofold. First, the effects
of implementing the IRP on Navy inventory management practices
at an ICP, and on readiness at a Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP),
are evaluated to determine the cost-effective benefits, if
any, to the Navy of continuing operations in this manner.
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Next, an asessment is conducted of what is currently
being performed by the private sector to reduce inventory
levels, and whether application of these practices can be
utilized by the military to reduce "excess" inventories.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
The primary research question of this thesis is:
Is the DoD Inventory Reduction Plan really accomplishing
the objectives for which it was created, or has it
actually resulted in increased costs and degraded the
levels of readiness throughout the fleet?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
The following subsidiary research questions are also
examined:
a. What specifically is encompassed in the mandated IRP?
And what does the plan hope to achieve for the
Department of Defense?
b. What factors led to the conception and subsequent
implementation of the plan?
c. Has the IRP impacted readiness at Naval repair
facilities? And, if so, at what costs?
d. Can the DoD utilize commercial inventory management
techniques to help decrease or prevent the recurrence
of excess inventory levels?
D. METHODOLOGY
The overall approach was to initially document specifics
of both the DoD and DoN reduction plans. Second, quantitative
and qualitative data were gathered to evaluate the effects of
implementing the IRP on a Navy depot repair facility and an
3
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ICP. Finally, information pertaining to inventory reduction
methodologies utilized in the private sector was researched
and analyzed for its potential application to the military.
The information necessary to complete this study was
obtained by utilizing four primary sources:
1. Navy Directives and Instructions. These informative
documents provide the policies and procedures by which the
operating forces function on a daily basis. Often voluminous
and, at times, subject to the interpietation of those who
implement them, they periodically leave one with an endless
string of questions. These questions can often be answered or
reinterpreted by the second source of information.
2. Interviews. Both in-person and telephone interviews
were conducted with a variety of personnel. The majority of
information for the study was obtained via phone conversations
with personnel from offices and activities such as Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Planning and Logistics
(uASD(P&L)), Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), Aviation
Supply Office (ASO), and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The
material and production control personnel and supply system
analysts at different levels of NADEP Alameda and Naval Supply
Center (NSC) Oakland also proved to be excellent sources of
information.
3. NADEP Alameda / NSC Oakland Reports and Records. The
"G" management (GMAN) reports and supply effectiveness data
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provided ,;.e crucial in making overall readiness and level of
service determinations.
4. Reference Materials. Various sources of reference
materials (i.e., Congressional hearings, Rand studies, GAO
reports) were utilized to gain a broader perspective of the
subject matter. In addition, numerous business periodicals
were utilized to obtain the information necessary to evaluate
commercial inventory management practices.
E. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The thesis will not provide an in-depth evaluation and
analysis of the entire DoD Inventory Reduction Plan. The
initial background information and program objectives
presented do pertain to DoD components, but the primary focus,
as will be seen throughout the remainder of the study, will be
on the Department of the Navy. In particular, this thesis
will not specifically address issues and procedures peculiar
to the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force or the U.S. Marine Corps.
During the research, it became evident that NADEP
Alameda's cost accounting system currently does not capture
the cost, duration, or nature of a material shortage delay in
any of its assigned programs. Therefore, a more complete
picture of the total costs associated with material shortages
at the repair facility will not be achievable. The GMAN
syst-m and effectiveness data presented in Chapter III will
5
hopefully provide some indication of the overall effect of
inventory shortages.
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II. REVIEW OF INVENTORY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
A. BACKGROUND
During the late 1970's, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) severely criticized the Department of Defense (DoD) for
disposing of material that could be utilized on weapon systems
or equipment that was still in its inventory, regardless of
the number of years of supply on hand. A new policy requiring
the retention of all material was responsively issued by DoD,
with the und~erstanding that a great deal of the secondary item
materials' would be eventually migrating into inapplicable or
unrequired inventory. 2  And with the introduction of new
weapon systems, and the military buildup of the 1980's,
secondary item inventory levels were definitely on the rise.
The amount of material needed for secondary item inventory
is computed based on forecasted customer demand, known
material requirements (such as scheduled maintenance), and war
reserve stocks. DoD annually summarizes its secondary item
inventory in the Supply System Inventory Report (SSIR). The
'Principal items include such items as ships and aircraft, and
secondary items include such items as spare and repair parts, fuel,
construction materials, clothing, and medical and dental supplies.
'Inapplicable secondary item assets are those quantities of
on-hand or on-order assets exceeding the established Approved Force
Acquisition Objective (AFAO). These assets are termed inapplicable
because there is no near-term need for the assets based on existing
demand and program data.
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SSIR is primarily a management tool used to monitor changes in
the total secondary item inventory.
DoD secondary item inapplicable assets had more than
doubled in value by Fiscal Year 1983 (FY83). As this trend
continued, by FY88, roughly one dollar in three invested in
on-hand inventories was invested in inapplicable inventory,
and 1 dollar in 10 of on-order investment was for inapplicable
assets. Table 1 shows that DoD-inapplicable on-hand assets
increased from $12.9 billion in FY83 to $27.5 in FY88, an
increase of approximately 113 percent. [Ref. 1]
Table 1
INAPPLICABLE ASSET GROWTH
(Current Dollars in Millions)
Asset Category FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88
On-Hand S12,912 $15,527 $19,870 $25,621 $26,630 $27,477
(29%) (32%) (31%) (39%) (35%) (35%)
On-Order $1,811 $2,528 $3,909 $4,148 $4,962 $2,945
(9%) (11%) (12%) (13%) (16%) (11%)
Source: Service/DLA Stratification Data
Percent of Total On-Hand or Total On-Order Assets.
In FY83, as shown above, roughly 29 percent of total on-
hand inventories were inapplicable. However, by FY88
approximately 35 percent of the inventories were inapplicable.
Comparable data is also shown for the on-order assets. The
dollar value of the inapplicable on-order assets increased
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from $1.8 billion to $2.9 billion in FY88, an increase of
approximately 61 percent. In other words, the total DoD on-
order assets, which were inapplicable based on dollar value,
increased from 9 to 11 percent during the FY83 to FY88 time
frame. [Ref. l:p. 19]
In November 1989, at the same time the Berlin Wall fell,
the Secretary of Defense sent a Defense Management Report to
the President. The report contained management initiatives to
streamline DoD's current business practices. To characterize
the submission of the report as timely, would be an
understatement, as the public began to openly criticize the
Defense Department for "...having wasted tens of billions of
dollars filling its warehouses with stockpiles of items
ranging from submarine spare parts to hospital gowns--things
the military doesn't need and, in some cases, doesn't even
know it has purchased" [Ref. 2].
On March 6, 1990 Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the
Committee on Government Affairs of the United States Senate,
presided over a hearing which discussed the "serious
condition" of the Department of Defense's management of its
supply system. After completion of numerous investigations,
conducted by the GAO and Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), which focused on the consistent growth of DoD
inventories, its supply system had been labeled a "high risk"
area. GAO, in particular, during various 1990 investigations,
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concluded that DoD had $34 billion worth of unrequired
inventory on hand[Ref. 3].
GAO's evaluation of the growth in aircraft unrequired
inventories, for example, showed that the most common causes
for the growth were overestimated use/demand rates and
modification of existing aircraft and equipment
[Ref. 4]. Also identified, as major causes for
unrequired inventory in ship and submarine parts, were
requirements that did not materialize, deactivation of older
ships, and replacement and phasing out of equipment
[Ref. 5]. The above factors also extend to other
systems and equipment types as well.
The Navy uses two years of historical use data to develop
demand forecasts for items in the supply system. Normally,
factors such as failure rate and field versus depot repair are
considered when computing the forecasts. However, new items
entering the supply system or items undergoing engineering or
design changes do not have past use data that represent future
requirements.
Therefore, demand rates are based on information from
maintenance, contractor, and user personnel or the demand
rates of similar items. If demand rates are wrong,
requirements will either be overstated or understated.
Modification programs, which usually correct deficiencies or
improve capabilities of weapons systems and equipment, involve
replacing items typically managed by the services. During a
10
modification program, requirements for old or replaced items
decrease while requirements for new installed parts increase.
There are obviously many other reasons for the increasing
levels of unrequired stock including: weapon systems, system
components and aircraft being phased out, improvement in parts
reliability, and reductions in war reserve or safety stock
levels. The reasons behind the increasing levels were
evident, but solutions to lowering the levels were not quite
so apparent.
The DoD inventory remains the largest in the world.
Composed of nearly five million line items, the inventory
includes material valued at approximately $109 billion. This
material provides replacement parts and other consumable items
to maintain the readiness of our ships, aircraft, tanks, and
other complex weapons systems used by our military forces and
for military personnel support needs.
Recent events in the Persian Gulf and Panama have shown
that the DoD material management system was then prepared to
meet recurring supply system demands. But major changes over
the past few years, concerning the threat facing the United
States and our allies, have also highlighted the need for a
smaller more "flexible" material management system, capable of
rapidly responding to various threat scenarios.
Given the future uncertainties, the Department of Defense
must begin to limit purchasing to smaller quantities until
future needs are better defined. As Chairman Glenn reiterated
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during subsequent Congressional hearings, uDoD is buying more
than it needs, what it is buying is often substandard and not
to specifications, and it doesn't seem to be able to
adequately account for or control what it has." [Ref. 3:p. 2]
In addition, Mr. Frank C. Conahan, then Assistant Comptroller
General, National Security and International Affairs Division,
U.S. General Accounting Office, addressing an earlier
committee stated:
Although in our work we found no dominant reason to cause
inventory growth, we believe the growth results from a
tendency to stock far into the future. This is fostered
by a management philosophy that rewards obligating funds
and filling orders. There is no corresponding emphasis on
economy or efficiency.[Ref. 61
Opinions may have varied somewhat as to the primary cause of
increasing levels of inventory growth. Nevertheless, in May
1990, Cbngress reached a consensus and mandated the
implementation of the DoD Inventory Management Program.
The Material Management Board (MMB) 3 , which would be
chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Logistics), was established to recognize the requirement for
top-level DoD coordination of the program. One of many
functions of the MMB was to oversee management of the DoD-wide
Inventory Reduction Plan.
3The MMB provides the Secretary of Defense and his staff a
mechanism fc- onerational oversight to direct implementation of
Defense mateiiai management initiatives and programs.
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In addition to the emphasis placed on the MMB, three
elements, which were contained in the Secretary of Defense's
Defense Management Report, and considered essential to the
success of the reduction program, include:
1. Moving toward a new and more efficient organization for
managing the DoD Supply System;
2. Establishing an improved, integrated information
management system through DoD's Corporate Information
Management (CIM) effort;
3. Implementing a series of policy and functional
management improvements and applying technology to
provide greater support at a lower cost with smaller
inventories.[Ref. 7]
The primary focus of the DoD Inventory Reduction Plan is
embedded in the third element above.
B. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES OF THE IRP
The overall goal of the DoD Inventory Reduction Plan,
quite simply, is to reduce the Department's cost of doing
business. If all goes according to schedule, the plan is
designed to save $18 billion by FY97. The IRP is designed to
determine the appropriate size of DoD material inventories,
reduce annual material budget requirements in a systematic
manner, and preserve weapon system and personnel readiness.
The success of this plan is an essential element of the
Department's overall program to effectively manage future
13
force reductions, changes in operating tempos, base closures,
and budget reductions.
The IRP includes all phases of material management from
the introduction of an item into the supply system through
weapon system retirement. The five specific objectives which
the plan is expected to achieve are to:
"• Minimize the Quantity of New Items Entering the Supply
System.
"* Reduce the Number of Items Currently in the System.
"• Reduce the Quantities of Material Stocked.
"* Pursue Commercial Alternatives to Material Stockage.
"* Improve Material Control and Asset Visibility.[Ref. 3:p.
1381
Minimizing the quantity of new items entering the Supply
System will definitely be a challenge. This objective will
require a complete revamping of the military acquisition maxim
of procuring the most technologically advanced system
possible. From this point on, more emphasis will need to be
placed on obtaining the Best Available Technology (BAT), that
is, systems that will be easier to maintain, are more
reliable, and are more compatible with existing technology.
This should result in lower overall unit costs, yet increase
all levels of operational readiness.
Reducing the number of or disposing of items currently in
the system will need to be monitored closely. The future
redesign of systems, equipment, and their components will
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require DoD to carefully examine tradeoffs associated with all
costs involved. The primary focus should be on reducing
current levels of inventory and those costs associated with
redesign or additional procurement of "dual" purpose
components.
Obviously, reducing the quantity of material stocked will
be a move in the right direction, as long as readiness
standards are maintained. The primary material management
concept being utilized in private industry to achiele this
objective is the Just-In-Time (JIT) method. The possibility
of successfully utilizing this or similar programs, in a
military environment, will depend, to a great extent, on the
ability of the services and their suppliers to develop
positive working relationships with one another. Issues
related to DoD potentially implementing the above management
technique is more fully discussed in a later chapter.
In addition to reducing the number of items currently in
the system, we must also exercise extreme caution in regard to
pursuing commercial alternatives to satisfy material
shortages. If the government is not careful, it could very
well end up applying the savings achieved from stocking less
inventory to those acquisition costs associated with
commercial procurement. The procurement of $400 hammers and
$2,000 ash trays are two examples that quickly come to mind.
When the government finds itself in a situation where it
has an unexpected increase in demand, for an item that has
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suddenly become "critical," it can usually expect to pay a
much higher price to acquire that item. Especially, when the
item is only available under a previously expired sole source
contract. The expensive stockage costs could be attributed to
high Research and Development (R&D) costs that were incurred
to produce the item or the sophisticated technology associated
with the item. The ability of the suppliers to provide
required items during wartime, as well as peacetime
situations, must also be considered.
Improving the control and visibility of inventory items
will definitely benefit all concerned parties in the
acquisition process. The Gulf War demonstrated the fact that
everyone involved in the material management process needs
better and more timely information on the location of
inventory. Better visibility of assets will provide two key
benefits. First, it will prevent the procurement of new
material when it is available at other activities or in
another Service. Secondly, better visibility will ensure that
we can locate material anywhere in the storage or
transportation system to fill high-priority requisitions
quickly.
C. NAVY'S ORGANIZATION FOR IRP
This section provides a brief synopsis of the function of
the Navy's Inventory Management Improvement Plan (IMIP), its
goals, and key personnel associated with its administration.
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In addition, areas being impacted by improving interpersonal
working relationships within the Navy's Inventory Control
Points (ICP's) will also be addressed.
1. Management Organization and the IMIP
The Navy manages the DoD Inventory Reduction Plan
(IRP) within its Inventory Management Improvement Plan, which
was initiated by the Navy in 1988 to analyze and reduce
significantly high levels of secondary item inapplicable
inventory. As mentioned earlier, inventory levels increased
consistently during the 1980's. Management's emphasis, during
this time, was focused on force growth and modernization,
readiness improvement, material accountability and the
introduction of automated data processing (ADP) systems which
would hopefully improve the efficiency of operations.
DoD's moratorium on the disposal of obsolete/excess
material, in conjunction with the Navy's focus on improvement,
inevitably resulted in increased inventory levels. It was the
growth of the Navy's secondary item inventories that resulted
in the initiation of the IMIP. The IMIP was intentionally
designed to get top managements attention and bring innovative
ideas to bear on the problem of inventory growth. The IMIP
initially had only three goals: reduce inapplicable
inventory, preclude the introduction of additional
inapplicable inventory and address the underlying causes of
inapplicable inventory[Ref. 8].
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A Navy flag officer assigned as the Deputy Commander
for Fleet Logistics Operations in the Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP) directly administers the IMIP. Other top
logistics managers from the Naval Supply Systems Command,
Office of Naval Personnel (OPNAV), Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Design and Analysis (ASN(R,D&A)), Hardware
Systems Commands, Fleet Commands, Inventory Control Points and
Supply Centers have actively participated in the program.
Defense Management Report Decisions (DMRDs) 901 and
987 contain the estimated savings ($18 Billion) and other
financial goals associated with the programs. Individual
proponents have been identified for each DMRD initiative and
are being held responsible and accountable for pursuing the
effective implementation of each DMbD and the achievement of
projected savings. NAVSUP has been designated as the
proponent for the Navy Inventory Reduction Plan. The NAVSUP
Deputy Commander for Financial Management and Comptroller is
the proponent point of contact. Progress on the initiatives
is reviewed quarterly.
During FY91, the Under Secretary of the Navy directed
the Auditor General (Navy) to begin a detailed review of all
DMRDs. The purpose of the review was to determine whether the
implementation plans were workable and to assure that all
necessary and appropriate management actions were being
pursued to achieve projected savings. In the case of DMRD 901
initiatives, which deal with reducing supply system cost and
18
contribute the vast majority of Navy IRP savings, results
verified that Plans of Action & Milestones (POA&Ms) and a
savings tracking system were in place and that savings
estimates were realistic and achievable.[Ref. 9]
2. Cultural Change
The Navy's incorporation of Total Quality Management
principles, in relation to inventory management, has resulted
in the implementation of a cultural change which is being
aggressively pursued. Significant strides are being made
daily, and Navy managers are continually focusing their
efforts on improving interpersonal working relationships up
and down the chain of command. Areas in which the inventory
managers' culture at the two Navy ICPs, Aviation Supply Office
(ASO) and Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), have been
impacted are as follows:
"• Performance appraisals specifically address supply system
improvements.
"• Functional training has been improved.
"• Rewards and incentives are fostering employee commitment
to continuous improvement.
"* Item managers have been empowered with the authority and
tools to make better support decisions. They have been
given increased control over assets.
"• Performance measurements focus on cost-effective
operations. Corporate goals are clearly defined and
understandable at the lowest level of the
organization. [Ref. 8:p. 2]
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Results, taken from a random survey of inventory
managers during SPCC's command inspection (23 October - 08
November 1991), showed a definite trend toward a change in
inventory management philosophy. SPCC's command inspection
team believed that appropriate emphasis is now being placed on
command inventory reduction objectives.[Ref. 8: p. 2]
D. NAVY MAJOR MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES
The Navy's primary mechanisms for reducing its levels of
secondary item inventories, and accomplishing the goals of
addressing causative factors, precluding new inactive
inventory, and reducing inactive inventory, are contained in
five major management initiatives. These management
initiatives, which are tied to Defense Management Report
Decisions 901 and 987, are as follows:
1. Project Boss
2. Reduced Acquisition Lead Time
3. Reduced Intermediate Inventories
4. Reduced Consumer Inventories
5. Reliability Improvements[Ref. 8:p. 15-19]
The Navy's Buy Our Spares Smart (BOSS) Program is designed
to reduce the total cost of spares simply by increasing the
competitive procurement associated with the particular items
being purchased. Navy policy now allows the use of available
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funding to purchase the technical data and drawings through
the stock funds accounts. This change gives supply managers
the ability to obtain the information necessary to breakout
sole source contracts by developing competitive sources for
previously sole source items. Project BOSS resulted in FY91
outlay savings of $166 million[Ref. 8:p. 151
The objective behind reducing the acquisition or
procurement lead tme is to reduce the overall inventory
levels. Different initiatives, such as using electronic data
interchange (EDI), reducing contract terminations and even
expanding multiple-year contracting, are currently being
utilized by the Navy to negotiate better delivery lead times
with suppliers. The Navy established an initial program goal
of 25 percent reduction in lead times. Reduced acquisition
lead times wiil definitely reduce future obsolescence costs,
resulting in greater inventory savings.
The concept of total asset visibility (TAV) comes into
play when discussing reduction of intermediate inventories.
TAV will enable the lateral redistribution of assets above the
requisitioning objective (i.e., excess material). Expanded
asset visibility will lead to reduced supply costs as a result
of an inventory requirements reduction. Unfortunately, as
intermediate inventories are minimized or eliminated, the
potential for further savings will decline.
By reducing consumer inventory levels, the remaining
assets will be optimized to achieve the proper balance between
21
investment and readiness. As a result, current aviation and
ship allowance baselines (AVCAL's and COSAL's) will be
reduced. Another method of reducing consumer inventories is
to avoid purchasing items when ships are decommissioning. And
the use of readiness-based sparing models should also be
considered for specifying lower stockage levels.
Navy reliability improvement initiatives focus on product
improvements or engineering changes that will decrease
equipment failure rates and, therefore, reduce logistics
support costs. New Navy policy allows stock fund investment
in reliability and maintainability improvements as long as
that investment results in decreased requirements for spares
and/or reduced logistics support costs.
With respect to secondary item inventory levels, Navy
inventories were valued at $22.6 billion at the end of FY91,
down $7.0 billion from 1990. The projected inventory for the
end of FY97 is $14.4 billion, a further decrease of $8.2
billion. In FY91, the Navy exceeded its savings goal by $86
million, having achieved a savings of $202 million. [Ref. 9:p.
56]
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III. EFFECT OF THE IRP ON INVENTORY MGHT AND READINESS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the effect of implementing the DoD
Inventory Reduction Plan (IRP) on two separate Naval
activities. First, measures being taken by the Aviation
Supply Office, one of the Navy's inventory control points
(ICP's), are examined to determine their effectiveness in
reducing current and future levels of secondary item
inventory.
The effect of material shortages, possibly caused by
insufficient inventory being on the shelf, is next evaluated
to determine the effect on production at the Naval Aviation
Depot (NADEP) in Alameda. This evaluation is primarily based
on NADEP-Alameda's management of Condition Code "G" materials
and their associated costs. In addition, readiness is
evaluated based on the level of service, from a material
availability standpoint.
B. REDUCTION PLAN FOR AVIATION SPARES
The Aviation. Supply Office (ASO) has implemented a five
year "savings" plan that management believes will reduce the
level of spare parts required for fleet support, thus enabling
it to meet savings goals imposed by Defense Management Review
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901. ASO's strategy called for the majority of the management
savings to be accomplished:
"• through shorter procurement lead times with better
forecasting,
"• through reduction in retail echelons made possible by
better models and better availability of information,
"* through targeted improvements in reliability which prevent
untimely failures, and
"• through the use of managerial alternatives to buying
spares, including reducing depot repair turn-around-time,
and repairing items that are now considered
consumables.[Ref. 10]
The above programs are expected to "avoid buying" and are
projected to save $1.936 billion in net obligations.
Competition is projected to double the amount of competitive
procurements which currently exist in ASO's annual buying
base. This will also result in substantial increases in the
level of savings.
In the area of production lead time ASO definitely has
room for improvement. A 1991 General Accounting Office (GAO)
report stated:
The Navy's Aviation Supply Office could improve
determinations of procurement lead time requirements for
aviation parts. Administrative lead time requirements
were not always based on actual experience. At one point,
the Aviation Supply Office had arbitrarily increased the
administrative lead times for all items by 9 months. In
calculating production lead time requirements, the supply
office did not consider some actual experienced lead times
even when these lead times were more realistic. It also
did not routinely obtain contractor estimates of lead
times or compare them with actual
performance.[Ref. 11]
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The production leadtime in the ASO database currently
approximates 150 days. This is a reduction from previously
established time frames, and based on empirical studies4 ,
should result in outlay savings as a derivative result of
reduced obsolescence.[Ref. 12] ASO is making the
assumption that they can avoid roughly 25% of the obsolescence
costs that are currently being charged to their customers
through Navy Stock Fund (NSF) surcharges.
Based on a recent study completed by the Center for Naval
Analysis, which recommended the use of the ARROWS model 5 for
requirements determination, ASO has taken a 10% reduction in
the value of new spares required for ships and stations. [Ref.
10] This reduction in the cost of allowances will be applied
to out-year provisioning of repairables and consumables. Yes,
this action will obviously result in additional savings to
ASO, but at what cost?
By reducing the numbers of spares on the front end of the
procurement process, ASO could possibly be setting itself up
4Based on a May 1990 GAO report, it was determined that
ovrr. ated lead times caused increased investment for larger
inv--itories, increased the chances of buying excess material, and
increased termination costs if requirements changed. Understated
lead times can cause shortages of needed supplies, which could
affect the operational readiness of weapon systems or their
components.
5The ARROWS model is the approved Readiness Based Sparing
(RBS) model. However, the use of ARROWS for actual allowance
computation requires approval from NAVSUP and OPNAV. ARROWS is
designed to compute consumer level requirements, i.e., Aviation
Consolidated Allowance (AVCAL) quantities.
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for potential supply shortfalls in the long haul. Instead of
saving dollars, this could result in expensive re-procurement
costs and increased leadtime for receipt of parts.
As the majority of repair contracts begin to convert from
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to Contractor Furnished
Equipment (CFE), ASO has assumed that the quality of the
forecasting will improve. They have estimated the cost
advantage at a cumulative 1% of the material cost of repairs
over the five years.
Building a strong Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECP)
program at ASO is strongly considered to be a long term base
from which to make constant reliability improvements. The
savings are projected to come from two sources in the area of
repair; the reliability investment in the procurement of
repairables will avoid repair costs as will the direct
investment in better repair methods.
The VECP program is a definite move in the right
direction. The savings which can be realized if this program
is handled properly are quite good. If a vendor or contractor
proposal is submitted and accepted, the Value Engineering
clause will provide for the contractor to share in:
1. The savings generated on the contract being performed--
"instant contract savings,"
2. Savings on concurrent contracts for essentially the same
items--.concurrent contract savings,"
3. Savings on future contracts--" future contract savings,"
and,
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4. Savings of the Government in operation, maintenance,
logistic support, or Government property resulting from
the value engineering change--"collateral
savings."[Ref. 131
In regard to Turn-Around-Time (TAT), ASO envisions savings
or cost avoidance to be obtair- 2. by not having to buy the
repairables needed for the longer TAT. Anticipated management
changes in the NADEP's and investment of $100 million in piece
parts to more closely align the depot level performance with
the pattern in Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMA's) is
considered by ASO to be the driving force behind this
initiative. The effort to reduce TAT is substantiated by a
RAND Corporation effort funded by NAVSUP/NAVAIR and the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.[Ref.10:p. 3]
Another initiative in which ASO will require the
developmental assistance of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
relates to the repair of consumables. ASO assumes that up to
20% of the dollar value of consumable items can be re-used at
an average of 50% of the cost of buying new items. The
Aviation Supply Office envisions finding low overhead repair
shops to repair items at $20-25 per labor hour versus the $50-
75 which would be charged at major commercial or organic
sites. Alternatively, ASO would utilize Intermediate
Maintenance Activities on a cost reimbursement basis, focusing
on the high cost, high usage items that drive demand.
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When you consider the facts, the above initiative seems
quite feasible. Our foreign allies have long been reporting
repair, reclamation, and refurbishment on items the Navy
regards as consumables. And with repairables generally being
repaired at a cost of 25 cents on a dollar, one can't help but
think of the savings which are possible.
The last element to be addressed in regard to ASO's
reduction plan for aviation spares focuses on competition.
The main impediments to competitive buying are design
stability, configuration control, and the existence of a
government owned technical support package.[Ref. 10: p. 51
ASO appears to have overcome all obstacles relating to these
impediments. Over the past five years the Aviation Supply
Office has recorded savings of over $600 million on first time
competitive buying of previously sole-source items. That
experience has lead to 30% cost savings when the breakout is
to unrestricted competition and a 17% savings when the
breakout is from prime contractor to original equipment
manufacturer.[Ref. 10:p. 5)
As stated above, all of the ASO cost or inventory
reduction initiatives are estimated to result in savings of
approximately 1.438 billion over the next five years. It will
definitely be interesting to see the bottomline in FY95.
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C. EFFECT OF MATERIAL SHORTAGES AT A RADEP
This section takes a close look at the effect material
shortages (due to lack of sufficient inventory) are having on
the production process at the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP) in
Alameda. In particular, Condition Code "G" repairable
components are evaluated in an attempt to ascertain what the
Navy should do to prevent the continued spending of millions
of dollars for material that is not responsively supporting
the fleet.
1. Material Pipeline
A major effect of a material shortage might be seen as
the reduction of output into the distribution channel.
Another way to view this is to compare a Navy repair depot to
any industrial plant: the depot will only be paid when
repairs are completed and engines are returned to the supply
system in ready-for-issue (RFI) condition. If output is
restricted, less material is available for sales to its
customers.
The Navy material pipeline, or distribution channel,
is comprised of RFI material and also not ready for issue
(NRFI) assets awaiting repairs. If an inventory manager is
attempting to achieve a set rate of supply effectiveness, he
can determine the number of RFI items required to support
fleet assets. The RFI portion of the pipeline, at this point,
may be considered fixed. It then becomes quite obvious that
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the pipeline becomes longer as the total repair time
increases.
A material shortage, or lack of ready assets, may
affect the pipeline in several ways. The shortage can quickly
cause a decrease in the production rate by increasing the
total time that the item remains unserviceable and therefore
unavailable for issue to customers. In order to maintain a
given level of supply effectiveness, the inventory manager
must maintain a higher level system assets than would be
necessary if no production delays existed. The pipeline costs
are the investment costs and holding costs of the level of
inventory.
For years the situation described above has been
standard routine for stock points and supply centers
throughout DoD. Have procedures really changed with the
advent of the IRP, or is it still "business as usual" in
regard to inventory or materials management? In the next
section, we focus on the production flow at a NADEP and
discuss the effect of having too few, as opposed to an excess
of, on-hand repair parts.
2. Description of maintenance
This section begins with an overview of the production
flow process for an aircraft, at a NADEP, prior to discussing
the effect of a material shortage. The researcher found it
30
extremely beneficial to have a working knowledge of how the
aircraft process worked.
The production flow during Standard Depot Level
Maintenance (SDLM) varies considerably depending on the type
of aircraft, engines, and components scheduled to be reworked.
Workload planning conferences are usually held two to three
quarters prior to inducting the aircraft or components, but
schedules are usually subject to revision at any time. During
the aircraft rework phase, a line is usually set up in one or
two hangars and the aircraft physically moves through the
stations in the line. Each station is assigned specific tasks
to accomplish as the aircraft is moving through.
As the aircraft proceeds through the hangar, it is
stripped of all components scheduled to be repaired or
replaced. Those items which are repairable are sent to
component repair, or the "feeder." Although it varies
considerably between types of aircraft and individual aircraft
themselves, approximately 300 to 400 components usually fall
into this category. Another 1000 components, however, are
removed to provide working access to the airframe or other
components in need of repair.
These "removed for access" components are stored until
the aircraft is ready to be reassembled. About this time the
reworked or new components should be arriving for eventual
reinstallation in the aircraft. Standard procedure dictates
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that, as far as possible, all components be reinstalled in the
same aircraft from which they were removed.
The process flow described above is different for a
component, yet quite similar for an engine. Descriptions of
these two processes are excluded because they are beyond the
scope of this study. Now, the question of what to do during
a material shortage needs to be answered.
During SDLM, material shortages are usually abated
through two forms of cannibalization: diversion, and
backrobbing. Diversion is the reassigning of an RFI asset
from one aircraft (or component or engine) to another. Any
components removed for access only, in addition to, newly
purchased parts may be diverted to any aircraft that might
require them.
Material and production control personnel at the NADEP
stated that diversions occurred "quite frequently," yet
presented little, if any, negative effects to the production
process. Occasionally, a small amount of administrative
effort is required to track the diversion cc that, eventually,
each aircraft ends up with the right parts. To the
researcher's disbelief, no formal statistical data is being
maintained regarding the frequency of diversions or on those
particular parts being diverted.
Backrobbing, although remotely similar, differs from
diversion in that the parts required are currently installed
on an aircraft and are only removed to satisfy an emergent
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requirement. For example, if a completed aircraft is on the
flight line for final predelivery testing, and suddenly has a
problem with its main landing gear, the NADEP will backrob a
replacement set of gear from an aircraft in process if there
are no RFI assets available. As with diversions, no
quantitative or qualitative information is logged concerning
backrobbings.
3. Condition Code 11GQ' Repairable Components
After tbe NADEP's artisan (maintenance technician) has
screened the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) store, and exhausted
all means (i.e., diversion, backrobbing) of obtaining material
shortages, he submits a requisition for each required item
through the Production Control Center (PCC) and Material
Resource Branch. The requisitions are screened and then
entered into the supply system. In actuality, this procedure
should be reversed. That is to say, the system should be
exhausted prior to diverting or backrobbing, but this usually
isn't the case.
Once supply system status on requisitioned material
indicates that 100% of the required material, for a particular
component, will not be available within 45 days of the
requisition date, that component automatically migrates to "G"
condition. In accordance with NAVAIRINST 4440.6D, a "G"
condition component is defined as a repairable component
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suspended from depot level rework due to a shortage of one or
more repair parts[Ref. 14]
When a component has been designated in "G" condition,
NADEP Alameda provides NSC Oakland, the Designated Supply
Point (DSP), with updated status on all parts requirements,
prior to physical transfer of the cepairable component to the
DSP. The Designated Supply Point is responsible, at this
point, for tracking and expediting the requisitions which are
driving the component to "G" condition. The components are
preserved and packaged, prior to "G" condition storage, by NSC
Oakland. In addition to these costs, NSC Oakland is also
responsible for transportation expenses related to the
component.
"G" condition material usually remains with the DSP
until all of the parts are available, at which time the
component is reinducted. NADEP Alameda would only keep the
"G" condition component if its size and/or disassembled state
made it virtually impractical to transfer.
Reinduction of the component, after all of the bit and
piece parts are available, should be done within two weeks, if
the NADEP isn't at full plant capacity with high priority
work, and the item has a repair requirement and is not in a
"due-in long supply" status (parts which are expected to be
received in the near future) [Ref. 13:p. 6]. Table 2 provides
a picture of "G" condition material status data at NSC Oakland
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for the months of FEB 93 through APR 93 based on the NG"
Management (GMAN) Report.
Table 2
G CONDITION MATERIAL STATUS
FEB MAR APR
G Condition Components
Number of Components 124 109 140
Number Awaiting Reinduction 19 15 5
% Awaiting Reinduction 15.3 13.8 3.6
Bit Piece Requirements
Due In 348 230 404
Dollar Value of G Condition Material ($ millions)
Components 3.1 3.6 4.2
Bit Piece Parts .45 .50 .44
Of particular interest in Table 2, is the fact that
the month of MAR showed a decrease from FEB, in both the
number of components migrating to "G" condition, and in the
number of bit piece parts due in. Yet, the dollar value of
"G" condition material is steadily increasing at approximately
16 to 17 percent each month. The bit piece part requirements
reflect the total quantity of parts due in each month for all
components in an Awaiting Parts (AWP) status. Once all bit
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piece parts are received, the "GO condition component goes
from AWP to AWI (Awaiting Reinduction) status.
Also noteworthy, is the consistent decrease in the
percentage of "G" condition components awaiting reinduction,
especially in the month of April. The total dollar value of
all components in "G" condition, as of 13 May 93 (the run date
of the data package) was well over $84.0 million (not listed
in Table 2). Likewise, the total number of "G" condition
components and those awaiting reinduction on 13 May, were
2,457 and 815, respectively. That means that at least a third
of all NADEP Alameda/NSC Oakland "GO condition components are
ready to be reinducted but are instead sitting around
accumulating additional holding or storage costs and a lot of
dust.
4. Material Availability
Based on the statistical data presented above, the
question of the possible lack of material support being
provided to the NADEP certainly enters ones mind. Material
shortages, from a supply standpoint, usually occur for one of
the following reasons:
"• Material which is available locally may not be delivered
quickly causing unnecessary days of delay in the
production process
"* Material may not be available locally even though it is
available within the Navy's supply system. This type of
shortage causes delays as the material is shipped to the
NADEP.
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* Material may not be available in the supply system at all.
This situation requires a procurement action (which means
leadtime), a manufacturer's production run (with its
leadtime), and shipping time. It could be-several months
to years before this material is available and in the
system.
The question of material availability, in a nutshell,
boils down to one of stocking policies and procedures. The
researcher, in an attempt to determine the level of material
availability currently being provided to NADEP Alameda,
requested Point of Entry (POE) effectiveness data from NSC
Oakland, for the major technical cogs being provided to the
NADEP. The information provided, for the quarter JAN 93 to
FEB 93, is displayed in Table 3.
Table 3
POINT OF ENTRY DEMANDS / EFFECTIVENESS
(Net Effectiveness for NADEP Alameda)
COG JAN F.EB MAR
9C 180/95.6% 179/90.5% 140/92.9%
9G 80/95.0% 191/94.8% 73/94.5%
9N 158/90.5% 499/96.4% 343/96.5%
9Z 87/87.4% 180/93.3% 205/95.6%
The Cognizance symbols (COG's) contained in column one
of Table 3 are two character numeric-alpha codes that are
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normally prefixed to national stock numbers to identify and
designate the cognizant inventory manager who exercises supply
management over specified categories of material. All 9__Cogs
denote Navy owned material that is managed by Navy Fleet
Material Support Office (FMSO).[Ref. 151 , The point
of entry data, in the remaining columns of Table 3, provides
the total number of requisitions (demands) by COG that NSC
Oakland received each month, followed by the net effectiveness
or percentage of the demands that were issued/satisfied
immediately (off the shelf). For example, in the month of
January for (9C) COG items, 95.6% of the total 180
requisitions received by NSC Oakland were issued from stock
on-hand to NADEP Alameda.
The data in Table 3 indicates, at least on paper, that
NSC Oakland is filling a very high percentage of the demands
received from the NADEP. This information seems to conflict,
at first glance, with the "G" condition data discussed above.
One might presume that if material availability were of the
quality indicated by Table 3, that total dollar value and
quantity of "G" condition components would not be at their
present levels.
In order to put this into perspective, let's consider
the repair of a particular component which requires five
different parts. Let's also assume that whether NSC Oakland
has a particular part is completely independent of it having
any other part (probabilisticly). This would make the
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probability of having all five parts equal to the product of
each separate probability. For example, using the JAN 93
effectiveness of .874 for the 9Z cog, the probability of the
NADEP receiving all five parts from NSC Oakland is (. 8 7 4 )S or
.5099.
In other words, there would be a little better than a
50% chance of obtaining all five parts. The current standard
for Supply Material Availability (SMA) is 85%. This only
attempts to highlight the seriousness of material availability
and its importance to the overall industrial effort.
5. Analysis
The above information relating to material
availability and "G" condition material can't help but leave
the impression that the Navy needs to take immediate action to
combat the material shortage problem which exists in its
NADEPs. The researcher is making the assertion that this is
not a NADEP Alameda problem only. This statement is based on
research gathered regarding other NADEP's, and from
conversations held with NADEP Alameda/NSC Oakland personnel.
Clearly, the Navy's investment in unserviceable
components is quite substantial, yet the fact remains that
something drastic needs to be done about the lack of readily
available assets in the system. This raises the possibility
that the DoD Inventory Reduction Plan may be moving the Navy
in the wrong direction. If the Navy can't adequately manage
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its inventories to support the fleet now, how can the Navy
expect to do so with fewer parts on the shelves in the future.
Obviously, the Navy has to learn to do a better job of
managing its assets in the years ahead. The next chapter
evaluates inventory management practices, which are being
utilized in the private sector, to effectively manage and
reduce excess inventory levels. The potential application of
these methodologies, to improve the way the Navy is currently
managing its supply assets, is also addressed.
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IV. PRIVATE SECTOR INVENTORY MXGT SYSTEMS AND PRACTICES
A. INTRODUCTION
The concept of inventory management held by Corporate
America began to change drastically in the late 1970's and
early 1980's. The belief that inventory levels should be
maintained at the lowest possible level, and be consistent
with the operation it supported, was soon accepted as good
business practice throughout industry. Companies quickly
began eliminating contingency stocks that had always been
maintained in the past.
Most companies today that have completely adopted the
philosophy of maintaining minimum inventory levels believe
that if excess levels of stock are maintained it only ends up
resulting in various types of inefficiencies for the entire
operation. Excess inventory is being viewed as a cost that
inevitably reduces current and future profits since it
increases carrying costs and potential write-offs for
obsolescence and damage.
However, companies are quick to point out that reduced
inventory levels don't just happen on their own. One common
theme underlying all successful operations, is that you must
have inventory reduction goals. Most companies today
emphasize the fact that inventory reduction goals and changes
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associated with inventory management should be a continuous
process, not a one-time program.
The next section will present two of the more prominent
inventory control systems currently being utilized in the
private sector today: Manufacturing Resource Planning II (MRP
II), and Just-In-Time[Ref. 16]. Of the two control
systems mentioned, Just-In-Time is by far the more popular
concept and is associated with the phrase "zero inventory."
B. INVENTORY CONTROL SYSTEMS
1. Manufacturing Resource Planning II
MRP II is a total management/departmental process
geared to controlling a manufacturing company's resources. It
is a three part system that begins with materials requirements
planning, extends this to production resources and finally
updates itself through a feedback loop.[Ref. 141
There are a number of specific prerequisites upon
which a MRP II system is based. First, a master production
schedule must exist for the independent demand item and it
must be able to be stated in a bill of materials. Second, the
bill of materials must precisely identify each inventory item
by a unique code and be extendible throughout the process.
That is to say, each new sub-assembly takes on its own part
number as production continues.
Next, the bill of materials must not only be
structured to reflect the manner in which the product is
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assembled but must list all the components of a given product
as well. The last prerequisite requires that inventory
records be available for all items under the system's control,
and that these records be accurate, complete, and up-to-date
it the MRP system is to be usetul.
In addition to the prerequisites above, there are four
basic assumptions that are made by the system:
I. Lead times for all inventory items are known and have
fixed values.
2. Each inventory item in the system goes into and out of
stock. This allows the manufacturing process to be
monitored from one stage to the next.
3. All components of an assembly must be available at the
time of assembly on the production line.
4. All work centers have unlimited capacity.[Ref. 14]
At this point, assuming all prerequisites have been
met, the mechanics of the process begins. MRP II takes the
master production schedule and determines the number of end
items needed in each time period. The bill of materials takes
this figure and determines the gross requirements for all
materials. Next, the net requirements are calculated by
adjusting the gross requirements for materials on hand by
using the current inventory status records. The formula is as
follows:
Net requirements = Gross requirements - [Inventory on
hand - safety stock - Inventory
allocated] (Ref. 14]
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If net requirements are greater than zero, lot sizes are
ordered with these being offset to allow for lead times at
each step in the production process and supplier lead times.
This is considered to be a push system because end items are
pushed out Dy materials ordeired and processed at an early
date.
MRP 11, by design, only determines what is needed,
when it is needed, and in what quantities. However, it may
not necessarily be a panacea for all manufacturing industries,
especially where repairable items are concerned. With
repairables, one simply doesn't know how much to order under
MRP II. If defects are discovered during the process, we have
no way of knowing how many items will be capable of being
repaired or how many will be beyond the capability of repair.
This, in addition, makes it difficult to determine the amount
of work capacity that will be required. Statistically
speaking, we could only make approximations to determine the
number of components to purchase and the amount of work
capacity associated with repairable items.
2. Just-In-Time Production
Just-In-Time (JIT) production was first developed as
a component of the Toyota Production System by Mr. Taiichi
Ohno. JIT is a philosophy that says a manufacturer should
produce only what the market demands, only as it's needed.
The objective is to have only the correct part in the correct
44
place at the correct time. Just-in-time has definitely
changed the way the inventory management environment
functions.[Ref. 14]
The JIT production method accomplishes four primary
objectives:
1. The lead time to produce a part is significantly
reduced.
2. There are no surplus or "lost parts" which may have to
be discarded.
3. Expediting is not required as all parts are "visible,"
in process, at all times.
4. Holding costs and the amount of capital tied up in work-
in-process inventory are drastically lowered because of
low inventory levels.[Ref. 14]
In oLder to accomplish the above objectives, a
"pulling system" is used. Each stage in the production
process draws, "pulls, u just the right amount of inventory
from the preceding process to keep it going. During the
process all production controls are keyed on the final
assembly line. All work centers feeding final assembly are
connected in a chainlike fashion. This enables the entire
production process to become synchronized with final
assembly.[Ref. 141
A Kanban system of inventory control is the means
utilized to accomplish the just-in-time production process.
Material flow control is accomplished by using a card called
a kanban. The type of information contained on the card is
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part number, name, provider's location, user's location,
quantity per container, container number, and total number of
containers for that part. Most kanban cards utilized today
are permanently attached to their
container.[Ref. 171
Once a container-with-card arrives from the maker
(supplier) of the item, the user begins using up the contents.
The time required to empty the container varies considerably.
It might take an hour to empty a container or it could
possibly take a week. But as soon as it is emptied, the
container-with-card goes back to the maker, which is the
signal to make and forward another one.(Ref. 15]
The containers circulate with identifying kanban
attached; they circulate rapidly when the use rate is high and
slowly when the use rate is low; they stop if there is no
demand for a certain part for awhile. This, therefore, allows
the card method to respond to the user's speedups and
slowdowns. Both the number of containers in the flow and the
number of units per container are fixed. These numbers are
usually set arbitrarily, keeping in mind the JIT philosophy of
minimal idle inventory and delay.[Ref. 15]
Three critical objectives must be achieved for
successful implementation of the just-in-time system. First,
the schedule for each day must be nearly identical. Second,
the production process, the equipment utilized, and work
spaces must be arranged and designed to provide a smooth
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material flow. To accomplish this objective, one must reduce
both setup and changeover times for one operation to another
and utilize Yo-i-don. Redesign of machinery, tooling, and
manufacturing processes, along with prepositioned changeover
kits are means of achieving a reduction in setup and
changeover times.[Ref. 14]
Yo-i-don is defined as the coordinated production of
parts into subsequent assemblies. Each work station strives
to complete its task in a given time window so delays are
minimized or eliminated. A light panel called Andon is used
to keep track of material flow. Whenever an operation is
having difficulties, its respective light comes on and
operators from other stations will assist in alleviating the
difficulty. This usually entails job standardization and
additional training for workers that are qualified to work
efficiently at different operations.[Ref. 14]
The final objective, defect-free production, is one
that all workers collectively must achieve. Being that Just-
In-Time production is highly dependent on the flow of parts
without delay, any disruption caused by a defective part
causes major problems. Autonomation, the routine
identification of defects in the production process, is
normally used to accomplish this goal. This can be in the
form of automatic inspection devices or inspection by workers
themselves.[Ref. 14]
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The workers, in this system, are responsible for
inspecting their own work as well as that done by others on
preceding stations. Jidoka, a term utilized for the
production warning system, becomes operational whenever a
defect is spotted. A switch triggers the Andon panel located
above the production floor. A red light alerts the work force
to a problem and the process is shut down until the situation
is corrected. It automatically becomes the responsibility of
everyone in the vicinity of a work station to correct the
problem whenever the Andon is lighted.[Ref. 14]
There are several benefits associated with the
successful implementation of a just-in-time system:
"• Inventory levels are drastically reduced.
"• Lead time is minimized. This enables the system to react
more quickly to changes.
"• Product quality is improved and discard costs reduced.
"• Production is streamlined and relatively problem-free,
because of the focus on problem solving.
"* Management and the work force are unified in striving
toward an established goal.[Ref. 141
The negative aspects of just-in-time focus on the fact
that the requirements of the system create obstacles which can
block JIT implementation. The roadblocks and percentage of
companies that have experienced, or expect to experience,
these obstacles are: organizational resistance (77%), lack of
systems support (78%), manufacturing constraints (74%), poor
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quality of purchased goods (69%), inability to define service
levels (76%), and poor JIT implementation
planning.[Ref. 18]
JIT principles require cooperation and interdependence
among departments and between companies. In addition, JIT
impacts all areas of a company's organization and requires a
major culture change. These types of organizational changes
can be difficult to adjust to for some companines. Despite
the above difficulties, companies are continuing to plan for
and implement JIT to gain the competitive advantage.
C. INVENTORY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Two consistent factors seem to characterize companies that
are persistently striving for significant and sustained
reductions in their levels of inventory. First, top
management is dedicated to and insistent on bringing about
operational change. Second, the companies are managing change
by focusing on the entire business or operation cycle. The
traditional concepts of business management are now being
challenged. Companies no longer view decisions from a
functional or single manager perspective, but rather in the
context of a company as a whole.[Ref. 17]
In order to attain the goals of reducing inventory while
maintaining customer service levels, companies have begun to
utilize some of the following techniques:
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* Simplifying the inventory handling and decision-making
processes.
* Automdting the processes where appropriate.
• Integrating processes both between the company and its
suppliers, carriers, and customers, and within the company
itself.
• Establishing controls in systems and operations.
(Ref. 19]
Automation in some way, shape, or form seems to be the
first recommendation of management for most major problems
confronting today's big business. But managers in companies
who stress the importance of simplifying inventory and
management processes believe that simplification of the
inventory cycle should take place before automation.
Automation, which is quite appropriate for a fine tuned
organization, is simply not a cure for an inefficient
operation. By analyzing many of the day-to-day decisions
affecting inventory levels, such as the physical movement of
inventory, processes are being simplified by eliminating
unnecessary steps.[Ref. 173
Automated Data Processing (ADP) does in fact produce many
benefits for many companies in the areas of control, accuracy,
and even day to day management. This is especially true for
companies transacting business on a worldwide scale. The
development of an integrated inventory management system,
capable of supporting such functions as purchasing, receiving
and incoming quality control, warehousing, transportation, and
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requirements planning, is considered by most large companies
as vital to the success of the organization.[Ref. 17]
Automation and communication technologies are helping to
centralize requirements determination, which in turn leads to
lower stocking levels. Many private sector firms are also
improving their material handling functions (receipt, storage,
and issue) through automation, when it's practical to do
so.[Ref. 17]
Many companies today have found that one key technique for
improving inventory flow is better coordination of inventory
management functions both within the company and between the
company and its suppliers, carriers, and customers. Efforts
of this nature usually result in long term gains such as
improved relationships with suppliers, formalized integrated
planning within the company, and clearly assigned
responsibility for inventory levels within the company[Ref.
17]
Most of the operations managers in private industry seek
to reduce inventory while maintaining or improving service
levels. Since inventory is usually affected by the decisions
of various functional managers in the areas of manufacturing,
engineering, marketing, finance, and accounting, many
companies have begun to establish integrated planning
processes to minimize inventory levels while maintaining its
operating service goals. This process is usually a formal one
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that routinely brings together the separate functional
managers to plan for the future.[Ref. 171
Many companies in industry feel that in order to provide
operating discipline and to hold individuals and groups
accountable, they must have some type of performance
measurement system integrated with the inventory management
process. For example, some companies are using measures such
as dock-to-stock time, inventory turnover rate, and order fill
rate to monitor the performance of their materials flow
process.[Ref. 17) There are many types of performance
measures being utilized at all levels of the corporate ladder.
These measures are designed to ensý_.e all parties concerned
that everyone in the organization is working as efficiently as
possible, while remaining focused on the organizations goals.
D. ANALYSIS
Although there are differences in the inventory management
systems and management techniques used between the private
sector and DoD, the fact remains, that the ultimate goal of
reducing and sustaining minimum levels of inventory, while
maintaining or improving customer service levels is something
we now have in common. The reasons for holding inventory and
the strategies used to manage it have always differed between
DoD and industry. The military services basically hold
inventory to support missions with no-fail objectives. Thus,
the military perspective is the more inventory DoD has, the
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more sustained our military capability is to meet our no-fail
objective.
The private sector, on the other hand, holds inventory in
support of future sales with a profit objective. Since excess
inventories can be a drain on profits, more and more companies
have established goals to keep inventories to a minimum so as
to improve profits. Granted, private industry is roughly ten
years ahead of DoD in its thinking, nevertheless, the
Department of Defense can still improve inventory management
by utilizing private sector concepts and procedures.
Bqth Just-In-Time and MRP II (to a lesser degree) have
proven themselves to be effective in private industry. As
with any system, there are advantages and disadvantages
associated with using one or the other depending on the use
intended. MRP II, for example, is an excellent materials
requirements planning system which can be used to order
materials and track work in process inventory through the
production cycle. But unfortunately, this is about its only
positive attribute.
The MRP II systems primary drawback is that it is severely
lacking in the controlling and scheduling of production to
minimize work-in-process inventories and lead times. Just-in-
time, on the other hand, is an inventory control technique
that many in the highest levels of the Department of Defense
believe will increase efficiency and productivity in the
management of the military's multibillion dollar repair parts
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(spares) programs [Ref. 20]. So, what's DoD going to
do? DoD has been and is continuing its efforts to find a
solution to this seemingly insurmountable problem.
The Navy, in particular, has began utilizing expertise
from the private sector to improve its management of
inventory. Companies like Dupont de Nemours EI & Co., Ford
Motor Co., and Sears are sharing inventory management
practices with the Navy in such areas as receipt-stow-issue,
security, receipt, confirmation, and material in transit.[Ref.
16] In addition to the systems and techniques covered in this
study, there are many other planning and analysis techniques
used by private industry such as Distribution Requirements
Planning (DRP), Segmentation Analysis, and Value-Added
Warehousing. DoD and its subcomponents are faced with the
difficult task of choosing the best or most appropriate system
(or mix of systems) which will meet its force objectives in
the most cost-effective manner possible.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis has attempted to provide sufficient background
information on the Department of Defense (DoD) Inventory
Reduction Plan, to make an evaluation of its implementation
effects on Naval inventory management practices at an
Inventory Control Point, and on readiness at a Naval Aviation
Depot (NADEP). The Aviation Supply Office (ASO) in
Philadelphia, PA and NADEP Alameda were the two activities
chosen for this study. In addition, an assessment was made of
inventory control systems and management techniques currently
being utilized in the private sector to reduce inventory
levels.
The primary objectives of the DoD Inventory Reduction Plan
(IRP) are to minimize the quantity of new items entering the
supply system, reduce the number of items currently in the
system, reduce the quantities of material stocked, pursue
commercial alternatives to material stockage, and improve
material control and asset visibility. All DoD components are
responsible for reducing current levels of secondary item
inventories and/or their associated costs.
As an inventory control point, ASO has been tasked to
reduce its FY 93-97 Navy Stock Fund expenditures by $1.936
billion. ASO, in response, has implemented a five year
savings plan that will ultimately reduce costs and lower the
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level of spare parts previously being supplied for fleet
support. The plan is designed to shorten procurement lead
times by employing better planning techniques, improve the
reliability of systems and equipments via a strong VECP
program, and utilize competitive buying on a regular basis.
From all indications, ASO is meeting the challenge of
inventory or cost reduction head on.
NADEP Alameda is currently plagued with material
shortages. There are work stoppages, work-arounds, and other
administrative problems such as rescheduling and planning.
The production divisions handle the majority of the above
problems largely by diverting RFI parts from one inventory to
another. Another method is to backrob a part from a unit
which is not operational to allow another unit to become so.
Actions such as these at the NADEPs only serve to
temporarily sustain production, and they do have costs
associated with them. The material shortage problems that
appear to have the greatest effect are ones of material
availability rather than slow local delivery. One thing is
for certain, the Navy definitely needs to review its
investment in unserviceable components. The savings that
could be generated from returning these assets to the supply
system as RFI units would be tremendous.
The question of implementing a Just-In-Time inventory
method on a DoD-wide basis has yet to resolved. The ideal
operating environment for JIT is one where there is limited
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fluctuation in supply and demand, such as in a scheduled
manufacturing process; the supplier is geographically close,
and close cooperation and communication are characteristic;
supplies are in small lots, and frequent deliveries are made;
and safety stock is considered excess. [Ref. 19]
The traditional DoD procurement, distribution, and
consumption environment has the following characteristics:
"* Demands are unpredictable due to variable mean-time-
between-failure and operational tempo
"* Proximity and identity of the supplier may change each
year or with each new contract.
"* There is significant administrative burden, such as the
requirements prescribed by the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) and DoD procurement regulations.
"* Often supplies are in large lots and small quantities, and
deliveries are infrequent due to budget constraints and
regulatory restrictions.
"• Safety stock is required for lead time and deployment
readiness requirements.[Ref. 19]
A comparison of the operating environment for successful
JIT implementation and the current operating environment of
the DoD inventory management program suggests that the two are
incompatible. Low inventory could result in more efficient
management of some items, but it would not be effective for
managing many critical items. If an inventory management
system for critical repair parts fails, it could result in
zero balances, or even worse, mission failure. DoD components
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can't afford to be purely "efficient" at the expense of a
mission.
Although there are substantial differences in Lhe
inventory management systems and techniques used between DoD
and the private sector, the military will greatly benefit by
learning and applying certain industry management concepts.
Techniques such as integrating processes between suppliers and
customers, establishing controls in systems and operations,
and simplifying the inventory handling and decision-making
processes are all achievable concepts. Private industry seems
is willing to share its ideas. The military needs to take the
next step and learn to apply the concepts.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
This study has shown that the overall effect of the DoD
Inventory Reduction Plan, at this point, has been both
beneficial in some respects and detrimental in others. The
fact that ASO is now working smarter to save dollars, does not
alleviate the material shortage problems confronting the
NADEP. Quite the contrary, ASO may only be compounding the
problem as they will be purchasing even fewer spare and repair
parts for future, fleet support.
The success or failure of the DoD Inventory Reduction Plan
is extremely difficult to determine at such an rc,_ly juncture.
It is this researcher's opinion that the answer, as in most
cases in dealing with DoD, will only be known in time. The
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lack of statistical data and empirical information available,
concerning the impact of the IRP on the Navy supply system,
indicates that the total DoD-wide system impact is not, as of
yet, being taken into consideration. This raises the question
of whether the system is being properly served, and probably
requires further research.
Additional work or research in the following areas would
be beneficial:
1. What can be done by the Navy to improve material
availability for aviation components?
2. What has been the effect of the IRP on the Ships Parts
Control Center (SPCC) and how has it effected the way
they are currently doing business?
3. How can the Navy best integrate diverse information
sources (such as Inventory Control Points, Naval Supply
Centers and the Navy Industrial Fund store) so it can
better analyze material problems?
4. What is the effect of the IRP on levels of service three
to five years from now? Have inventory levels actually
been reduced?
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